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Between the Species
Decentering Anthropocentrisms:
A Functional Approach to Animal
Minds

ABSTRACT
Anthropocentric biases manifest themselves in two different ways in
research on animal cognition. Some researchers claim that only humans have the capacity for reasoning, beliefs, and interests; and others attribute mental concepts to nonhuman animals on the basis of behavioral evidence, and they conceive of animal cognition in more or
less human terms. Both approaches overlook the fact that languageuse deeply informs mental states, such that comparing human mental
states to the mental states of nonlinguistic animals is misguided. In
order to avoid both pitfalls — assuming that animals have mental
lives just like we do, or assuming that they have no mental lives at
all — I argue for a functional methodological approach. Researchers
should study animal cognition by identifying environmental inputs,
the functional role of internal states, and behavioral outputs. Doing so
will allow for cross-species comparisons in a way that the use of folk
psychological terms does not.
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“If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.”
— Ludwig Wittgenstein

Introduction
Some of the most influential Western philosophers, including Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, have distinguished human beings from nonhuman animals on the basis of
mental phenomena. Although humans have a nonrational part
to them (the body), they are different in kind from (nonhuman)
animals because of their capacity to reason, their intellect, or
their souls. Human beings are said to have minds, while animals are believed to be merely sophisticated biological machines whose behavior is driven by instinct and conditioned by
external stimuli.
In the wake of Darwin, the continuity between humans and
animals has been widely recognized, to the point where many
contemporary philosophers and scientists attribute mental
concepts, sometimes very sophisticated mental operations, to
animals. In addition to the physical homologies arising from
a common evolutionary ancestor, they claim that humans and
some animals also share mental homologies, such as the capacity to feel pain and pleasure (Singer 2002); the having of
interests, including a categorical interest in continuing to live
(Regan 2004); the ability to categorize experiences based on
abstract concepts (Vauclair 1996); causal reasoning (Call
2006); an understanding of others’ mental states (Premack and
Woodruff 1978); and even a kind of rudimentary moral agency
(Bekoff and Pierce 2009).
These two groups of theorists come to very different conclusions regarding the inner lives of animals: one group argues
for humans’ uniqueness, and the other group identifies compa-
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rable mental traits in both humans and animals. Although these
interpretations seem to contradict one another, both of them
presuppose an underlying anthropocentrism regarding mental
phenomena, and thus they fail to understand animal cognition
as unique to its kind. Specifically, both groups approach animal cognition in terms of human-centered, folk psychological
concepts, and then either attribute them to animals or deny that
animals have them — anthropomorphism and anthropodenial
(de Waal 1997), respectively.
In this paper, I argue that, in order not to mischaracterize animal cognition through the lens of anthropocentrism, we must
avoid appealing to subjective mental states and instead use
functional criteria to identify the continuities between humans
and animals. That is, we must identify physiological states, including brain states, that connect experimental stimuli and behavioral outputs, and make comparisons between species based
on the functional role that they play. Only then can we avoid the
pitfalls of anthropocentric thinking to which both approaches
are susceptible.

Inhuman Beasts or Furry Humans?
The traditional approach to the human-animal divide is well
known and needs no extended discussion here. It suffices to
say that, for much of Western intellectual history, animals have
served as a kind of foil against which we define ourselves (Derrida 2008; Oliver 2009). Unlike animals, humans are rational
beings who use complex language, make ethically informed
decisions, have a sense of history, and participate in culture.
For example, Descartes (1637) describes animals as mere bodies that lack souls and thus move by a kind of mechanical operation, in contrast to humans, who also have immaterial souls
and are capable of rational thinking and autonomous action.
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Descartes’s heirs among contemporary comparative psychologists include Derek Penn, Jennifer Vonk, and Daniel Povinelli, among others. For example, Povinelli and Vonk claim
that the behavior of chimpanzees, unlike human behavior, can
be explained in terms of relatively simple behavioral rules that
they form based on observation of others’ behavior (rather than
making inferences about others’ psychological states), and that
their tool use and understanding of causal principles are different from ours because of their inability to generalize from specific cases (Povinelli 2003; Povinelli and Vonk 2003; Povinelli
and Vonk 2006; Lurz 2011). Penn and Povinelli conclude that
“human minds” are “qualitatively different” from animals’ cognitive faculties in several ways, especially because we, unlike
animals, are able to “reinterpret” our experience conceptually
“in terms of higher-order, structural, role-governed relations”
(Penn et al. 2009). All of these theorists believe that humans
are capable of a kind of abstract thinking that animals, even the
most complex animals, are not.
Despite this longstanding tendency to define ourselves in opposition to animals, there is a corresponding tendency (among
both researchers and the general public) to assign humanlike
qualities to nonhuman things, especially animals. For many
scientists who study animal cognition, man is still the measure
of all things in the sense that they reduce the complexity and
uniqueness of animal life to something that we can describe
in rational or human terms. For the most part, comparative
psychologists reject Povinelli’s conclusions and commit themselves, implicitly or explicitly, to an argument by analogy: if
mental states cause observable behaviors in human beings, then
similar behaviors in animals must be caused by similar mental states. The principle of parsimony, which, in the study of
animal cognition, is traditionally identified as Morgan’s Canon
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(1894, 53), has given way to what Frans de Waal, reflecting the
current anthropocentric trend in comparative psychology, calls
the principle of “evolutionary parsimony”: “if closely related
species act the same, the underlying mental processes are probably the same, too” (de Waal 2006, 62). The assumption here
is that animals who are like us, or who behave in similar ways,
share similar subjective states, and that we can thus use the
same mental concepts — beliefs, desires, and intentions, for
example — to explain their behavior as our own.
It is difficult to accept that de Waal’s approach is parsimonious, even if it seems intuitively correct, since it multiplies
the number of unverifiable cognitive processes to which we
are committed. Still, many comparative psychologists have
(implicitly or explicitly) adopted this principle as an interpretive presupposition in their scientific research. To give only
one example, Anderson, Gillies, and Lock (2010) describe how
a group of captive chimpanzees responded to the death of a
group-member, and they claim that “several aspects of their
behaviour recall those of mothers with dying infants, and are
strikingly reminiscent of human responses to peaceful death”
(R350). They list the different responses of the chimps, followed by “possible human counterparts,” including testing for
vital signs and trying to resuscitate the corpse, and they conclude that, like humans, chimpanzees have an “awareness of
death” (R350, R351). Since David Premack and Guy Woodruff’s (1978) seminal article claiming that chimpanzees have a
“theory of mind” by which they attribute beliefs, desires, and
intentions to other individuals, many comparative psychologists have also designed experiments with the aim of demonstrating that nonhuman animals (not only chimpanzees) are like
furry or feathered people — with an understanding of meaning,
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the ability to represent the future, and cultures that are worthy
of anthropological study.

Language and Cognition
Unfortunately, when researchers conceive of animal minds
as variations on the human mind, they misunderstand the function of language in the having of mental states. Without language — or, more precisely, without our way of conceptualizing ourselves and the world through language — animals cannot be said to engage in cognitive processes that are anything
like human thinking. R. G. Frey makes this point with regard to
the seemingly basic ability of all sentient beings to have interests. According to Frey (1980), animals are incapable of having
interests, or even having basic desires (as a kind of interest),
because in order to have interests, animals must be able to have
beliefs, and in order to have beliefs, they must have language.
Insofar as they lack language, then, they also lack interests.
Donald Davidson makes a similar claim: animals cannot have
beliefs because the mental concepts necessary for beliefs, including the capacity to have the concept of a belief and the ability to interpret the intentionality of others (who hold the subject
to account for what he or she claims), are too intellectually rich
for nonlinguistic animals to have (Davidson 1975, 1985; Fellows 2000).
A simple thought experiment will illustrate their claims.
Imagine that you are eating at the dinner table, and your dog
comes up and sits next to you. You may say, “He wants some
food.” That sounds simple enough. However, for this to make
sense, the dog would have to have a number of constituent beliefs: “There is food on the table.” (A belief about objects and
relationships between objects.) “This discomfort I feel is a sign
of hunger.” (A causal claim: lack of food causes pain.) “I can
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get the food by sitting here.” (Practical reasoning.) “Sitting
here will motivate the person to give me food.” (Understanding
intentional action by another person.) And so on. The problem
is that the dog is incapable of believing anything because there
is no sense in which he can assent to or even understand a declarative sentence such as “There is food on the table.” And if
he does not believe that there is food on the table, then there is
no way for him to want the food on the table. Animals are incapable of having beliefs because, among other things, they are
incapable of having second-order thoughts about their perceptions — namely, that their perceptions may or may not track the
world. Therefore, any animal that lacks language lacks beliefs.
And any animal that lacks beliefs lacks desires.
This is not to deny that animals try to fulfill their basic needs,
including the need to eat. But to label an animal’s inner state
(that gives rise to a behavior) as a desire is to equate it with a
mental event in humans that is very different from what must
be the cognitive process in animals. Although all animals (including humans) have instincts that motivate them to engage
in rigidly defined behaviors, only human beings have what
can properly be called desires, which we consciously accept
or reject, which we invest with psychological significance, and
which are interpreted and transformed in idiosyncratic ways
based on social conditions. For example, a hungry newborn
seeks out a breast, whether it is a human child or a giraffe, but
only in human beings does this basic instinct take on meaning
within a web of beliefs and give rise to a plurality of expressions, including eating disorders, fetishes, and other psychologically powerful associations.
Many people’s first impulse is to dismiss Frey and Davidson
as reflexive anthropocentrists. However, in order to rebut their
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claims, one must attribute a kind of rudimentary cognition to
animals that is independent of language, and this depends on a
wrongheaded assumption that language and thinking are only
contingently (and not essentially) related. Thus many people
believe that animals think, and think much as we do, even
though they do not have the language to express their thinking. Cameron Buckner (2013), for example, claims that animal
cognition and human cognition could be compared as long as
“we do our best to provide animals with learning histories and
cultural scaffolding comparable to those enjoyed by the human
subjects purported to satisfy the [competence] criteria” (866).
To test for a theory of mind among chimpanzees, then, he suggests that we study wild (non-captive) chimpanzees just as we
study “free-ranging” humans, observe chimpanzees interacting
with other chimps (and not in relation to human researchers)
just as we observe humans interacting with other humans, and
so on (866) — as if a chimpanzee in the wild has the same “cultural scaffolding” when it comes to understanding themselves
and others that a human has who is immersed, more or less
since birth, in linguistic concepts that define human thinking.
Contrary to the assumption that thinking and language are
separable in principle, we have come to understand how deeply
our thinking is shaped and even made possible by language.
This is one of Wittgenstein’s revolutionary insights. Sometimes
we pretend that, when we first learn language, we are assigning
words to concepts that we already have. Wittgenstein claims
that this account of language, as a vehicle for thought, only
really makes sense if we already have a language (2009). Our
language picks out the features of reality that matter (to our
culture or linguistic group) and ignores others. What we do
not have language for remains inarticulate, undetermined, and
obscure — not really thoughts at all. To think of language as
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the act of labeling objects, including mental objects (whatever
that means), conceives of us as spectators, viewing the world
and putting names to things. Instead, according to Wittgenstein,
language is a “form of life” (2009, §§19, 23, 241). In this vein,
Daniel Dennett (1995, 1997) has appealed to language, and the
deep ways in which language and experience are intertwined,
to deny that animal consciousness (if there is such a thing) is
anything like human consciousness.
In response to philosophers such as Frey and Davidson, some
cognitive ethologists, comparative psychologists, and philosophers have argued that animals do in fact have rudimentary
concepts and even beliefs. Bernard Rollin is typical. He gives
the example of a dog that sees what appears to be water: “An
animal may see shimmering on asphalt and believe it to mean
water (even as we do), but he is ‘publicly’ corrected when he
reaches the road and finds no water there” (Rollin 1990, 141).
According to Rollin, a dog has the same kind of mental experience that humans have (“even as we do”) when one of our
beliefs is challenged. “The dog approaches the road, thinking
that there is water there” — that is how we would think if we
perceived what the dog is perceiving. When the dog discovers
that there is no water, he changes his belief: “There is no water
there.” He asserts something else, much as we would upon discovering the mirage. And even though the dog does not engage
other language users to correct this belief — which Davidson
thinks is necessary for the having of beliefs — Rollin insists
that the belief can be tested (or “‘publicly’ corrected”) in other
ways, such as confronting the facts of the world.
To justify the claim that dogs or other animals have this kind
of inner life, there must be some evidence (beyond merely assuming de Waal’s principle of evolutionary parsimony) that the
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behavior can only be explained or can be best explained by
appealing to mental concepts. There is no such evidence here.
More likely, the dog approaches something that looks like water because, when it has done so in the past, it has been able to
drink. Its behavior has been reinforced with positive stimuli.
The dog walks away because the shimmering on the asphalt
cannot quench its thirst. We need not assume that there is a belief present in order to explain the dog’s actions. A simpler explanation in terms of behavioral conditioning does just as well.
Descartes claims that language serves as a sign that indicates
the existence of thoughts behind it (Descartes 1985, 140-41;
1991, 302-3, 366). We can reject this conception of language
and still insist that, without language, animals cannot have the
complex system of beliefs that is necessary for them to have
desires. However, if animals have no desires, then it does not
make sense to say that animals suffer, because they have no
desires that are frustrated. Here is where the refusal to apply
mental concepts to animals seems to lead to absurd consequences. Even if animals are incapable of beliefs, evolutionary
continuity and common sense support the hypothesis that many
animals experience pain. Vertebrate animals have nervous systems that are similar to ours, endogenous opioids appear under
physical stress, and they respond to harmful stimuli much as
we do, with cries or attempts to escape the cause of the pain.
In addition, the mammalian pain system has distinct sensory
and affective pathways that can be dissociated pharmacologically and surgically. This has led numerous researchers to claim
that all vertebrates, and perhaps some invertebrate animals, are
pain-conscious (sentient) organisms (Allen et al. 2005; Shriver
2006). Given the many physiological and behavioral similarities, it seems appropriate to apply de Waal’s principle of evolu-
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tionary parsimony and conclude that all vertebrates, human and
nonhuman, are able to experience pain.
We like to think that we can isolate the feeling of pain from
our interpretation of pain. For example, although most researchers working on animal cognition tend to use “pain” and “suffering” interchangeably (Dawkins 1980, 1990), Dennett tries
to differentiate the immediate feeling of “pain” from conceptladen “suffering.” He claims that some nonhuman animals may
be capable of pain, “depending on how we choose to define
that term,” but they cannot suffer because they “lack the sort
of over-arching, long-term organization that leaves room for
significant suffering” (Dennett 1995, 707-8). Temple Grandin
makes a similar distinction between “the sensory component of
pain” and “feelings about the pain,” which she also calls “suffering” (Grandin 2005, 180-87). Like Descartes, Dennett and
Grandin assume that language merely labels inner phenomena
that stand apart from and are unaffected by the language that
we use. Pain is some fact of the matter that is transformed into
suffering through the activity of thinking in terms of concepts.
However, we cannot have an experience, including the feeling
of pain, apart from concepts. Our subjective experiences are
temporally situated by us in a narrative and are made sense of
using conceptual tools that are made possible by language.

The Pitfalls of Folk Psychology
According to much of the Western philosophical tradition,
humans are rational beings and animals are nothing but dumb
brutes. As animals have been shown to engage in sophisticated
behaviors such as tool use, inferential reasoning, and deception, however, many cognitive ethologists have assumed that
animals must be capable of complex mental operations, and
in fact that their thinking is like ours. Both sides of the debate
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share a kind of Cartesian logic: they assume that either some
animals think like humans do or they have no inner life whatsoever. The comparison is always to human cognition. And so,
researchers on animal cognition tend to describe animals in human terms, as having a theory of mind, beliefs, and a certain
rudimentary kind of rationality, on par with what humans have
at a particular stage of mental development. Rather than questioning the Cartesian dichotomy, they simply draw the line differently, bringing some animals over to the side that had been
populated exclusively by humans.
We ought to resist both alternatives, neither of which can
accommodate evolutionary continuity and the crucial (especially linguistic) differences between humans and nonhuman
animals. Instead of animals having no interests and desires, or
having interests and desires like we do, there is a third possibility: that animals have mental states, including what we may
call desires (for lack of a better term), but not desires in any
sense that we would recognize if we had them. One can see
here that language runs aground. We do not know what to call
whatever it is that animals have, because we can only grasp the
subjective character of our own inner lives. How do we make
sense of this? Given our ways of thinking and our language,
we seem not to know how to comprehend animal cognition
without either making it nothing (anthropodenial) or likening
it to what we experience (anthropomorphism), both of which, I
have shown, are forms of anthropocentric bias.
When Dennett considers whether animals have a point of
view on their own experiences, he poses a rhetorical question:
“When we consider a creature that isn’t a teller — has no language — what happens to the supposition that one of its stories
is privileged?” (Dennett 1995, 704). Given the inability of ani-
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mals without language to conceptualize themselves and their
experiences (at least in the same way that we do), attempts to
understand animal cognition using our own mental predicates
is hopelessly misguided. It is hardly illuminating to talk about
consciousness in animals at all, given that consciousness in
humans is so ill-defined, but calling animal consciousness a
“primary” or “primitive” form of consciousness, or a “precursor” to human consciousness — language that is widely used
in comparative psychology — does not make the concept more
precise. Johan Bolhuis and Clive Wynne conclude that such
comparisons between human and animal mentation stifle progress in the study of animal cognition: “As long as researchers
focus on identifying human-like behavior in other animals, the
job of classifying the cognition of different species will be forever tied up in thickets of arbitrary nomenclature that will not
advance our understanding of the mechanisms of cognition”
(Bolhuis and Wynne 2009, 833). Similarly, William Mason
claims that the use of folk psychological terms covers over our
lack of understanding when it comes to human mental processes: “Mind . . . lacks ‘thing quality’; it is but a construct, hardly
more than a label, really, for complex processes and functions
that we are still far short of understanding in any creature, including ourselves” (Mason 1976, 931). Because we describe
our own cognitive processes in ill-defined, unscientific terms,
the anthropomorphic tendency to understand animal cognition
in human terms is bound to confuse rather than illuminate.
Anthropomorphism is so compelling because we continue to
define the human mind in folk psychological terms. By appealing to folk psychology, however, we are using a form of explanation that is confused to begin with, and we simply extend it
to animals. According to Allen and Beatrix Gardner, this leaves
comparative psychologists with two possible explanations of
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what they are doing when they attribute mental concepts, especially the notion of intentionality, to animals: “To the extent
that intention only stands for a correlation between an internal
stimulus and an external response, it explains nothing. On the
other hand, to the extent that human beings are explaining their
behavior when they speak of intentions . . . their explanations
can be as false as any other explanations” (Gardner and Gardner 1986, 480). The former interpretation is the most charitable
reading of what anthropomorphic researchers are doing: attaching a poorly understood mental label to a well-understood behavioral phenomenon. The problem is that many researchers
take themselves to be doing the latter: making claims about
the internal lives of animals based on behavioral research,
inferential claims that are either true or false. When they do
this, their inferences about animal cognition are at best false
because of the absence of a shared language between humans
and animals. Worse than that, such claims may be unfalsifiable
nonsense, given the challenges facing our attempts to define
folk psychological terms in ways that are scientifically respectable (Churchland 1988; Churchland and Churchland 1996). As
long as researchers insist on referring to subjective states as
hallmarks of mindedness, they cling to a theory that inevitably
limits what they can reliably say about animal cognition.

The Promise of Methodological Functionalism
To make real progress in comparative psychology, without the intellectual baggage of (the two forms of) anthropocentrism, researchers ought to adopt a functional approach to
mind — not necessarily as a theory of what the mind is, but as
a methodological presupposition. That is, researchers studying
animal cognition should talk about environmental inputs, the
functional role of internal states, and behavioral outputs rather
than attributing humanlike psychological concepts to animals,
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and they should remain agnostic about what kind of subjective states animals have. If we cannot find a way around folk
psychological concepts — if, as Pamela Asquith claims, “anthropomorphism is unavoidable or inevitable” because ethologists are bound by “established semantic fields in ordinary human discourse” (Asquith 1984, 139, 145) — then such concepts should be understood as shorthand descriptions of inner
states (whatever they are) that play the same functional roles
for humans and animals. Mental properties are replaced by or
reduced to functional properties.
A functionalist methodological approach allows us to remain agnostic about folk psychological similarities, neither to
deny them nor to attribute them across species, while continuing to study animal cognition and its relation to human cognition. This approach may sound similar to the recent suggestion by Kristin Andrews that researchers ought to start from the
bottom-up rather than by assuming cognitive similarities from
the beginning that are then justified by empirical research:
empirical research on animal cognition aims to determine which attributions are truly attributable to different species, whereas the charge of anthropomorphism
is a pre-empirical obstacle to this research. Rather than
focusing on the obstacle, I suggest that we ignore it as
a prejudice, and instead work on developing methods
for testing the applicability of specific properties. (Andrews 2009, 52)
Andrews’s approach is promising. The problem is that empirical methods can, at best, establish functional states and not
subjective, cognitive states, which seem, after all, to be what
Andrews is after: to validate the attribution of subjective men-
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tal traits (or “properties”) across species. Researchers cannot
“ignore” anthropocentrism as long as they seek ultimately either to apply or to withhold folk psychological concepts on the
basis of empirical research — that is, either transforming animals into feathered or furry humans, or excluding them from
the community of thinkers because they do not think like we
do. As long as Andrews and others define mental properties
in folk psychological terms, they are not discoverable and anthropocentric projections are inevitable. Researchers can best
get beyond anthropocentrism by putting aside the terminology
that inevitably defines animals in relation to humans’ subjective
mental states.
By focusing on functional similarities, researchers will be
able to explore evolutionary continuity between humans and
animals without reducing one to the other. Consider pain once
again. If we define pain as a subjective feeling, then animals
can only experience pain if they have the state of consciousness
that we have when we are in pain. However, it is more scientifically tenable to understand pain in functional terms. If the animal’s inner state serves the same function as the feeling of pain
does in human beings — if there is a similar causal relationship
between sensory inputs, internal states, and behavioral outputs
as there are in humans — then the organism is in pain, no matter what the animal’s subjective experience is. Philosophers
such as Frey, who deny that animals feel pain, assume that pain
is a feeling that must be set in relation to certain beliefs. But
some animals, most notably vertebrates, have inner states that
serve the same adaptive function as the feeling of pain does for
us. Because of that, they can be said to be in pain, functionally
construed, regardless of what they “feel” — that is, regardless
of whether their subjective mental state is the same as ours.
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Many evolutionary anthropologists have begun to take this
approach in their research, eschewing mental terms in favor
of functional criteria for making comparative claims. For example, Redouan Bshary’s studies on fish and bird cognition
examine the decision rules that give rise to social cooperation,
tool use, and anti-predator behavior. And he suggests that these
findings may be used to explain seemingly more complex primate behavior, without appealing to belief-desire formations
(Bshary, Wickler, and Fricke 2002; Tebbich and Bshary 2004;
Penn 2011). With the shift to a functionalist methodology, the
comparison between human minds and animal minds becomes
possible. Sensory inputs, neurochemical states, and behavioral
outputs are able to be studied empirically across species. Comparative psychologists would still be studying animal cognition, but cognition understood in functional rather than folk
psychological terms.
Despite the dubious scientific value of folk psychology,
some functionalists, most notably David Lewis (1966, 1972)
and D. M. Armstrong (1993), think that mental concepts could
be identified with functional concepts. If that were to happen,
however, the matchup would be species-specific rather than
across species. For example, intentionality may serve a particular functional role for humans, but may not serve the same
role for other animals, even if intentionality could (somehow)
be attributed to them. There are individual but not universal
type-type identities, so that, even if we talk about propositional
attitudes as functional states giving rise to certain behaviors
(the belief-desire model) generally in humans, the explanation would not apply to nonhuman animals. Therefore, even
comparative psychologists who cling to folk psychology ought
to forego such ill-defined mental terms with reference to animal mentation. The attributions made by philosophers and re-
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searchers such as Singer, Regan, Vauclair, Call, Premack and
Woodruff, and Bekoff would then become something other
than anthropocentric projections.

Conclusion
Some animals can be said to experience pain and have interests, to make inferences, and to have an awareness of death.
Such claims are supportable as long as they are equivalent to
discernible functional similarities, but they are not supportable
if they are supposed to be inferences about animals’ subjective
mental states, discovered on the basis of similar behaviors in
humans and animals. When comparative psychologists adopt
functionalism as a methodological assumption, they can help
us to advance beyond anthropocentrism, to see the commonalities among humans and animals, and to conceive of animal
cognition on its own terms.
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